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Abstract
In recent work of Hazan and Krauthgamer (SICOMP 2011), it was shown that finding an ε-
approximate Nash equilibrium with near-optimal value in a two-player game is as hard as finding
a hidden clique of size O(log n) in the random graph G(n, 1
2
). This raises the question of whether
a similar intractability holds for approximate Nash equilibrium without such constraints. We
give evidence that the constraint of near-optimal value makes the problem distinctly harder: a
simple algorithm finds an optimal 1
2
-approximate equilibrium, while finding strictly better than
1
2
-approximate equilibria is as hard as the Hidden Clique problem. This is in contrast to the
unconstrained problem where more sophisticated algorithms, achieving better approximations,
are known.
Unlike general Nash equilibrium, which is in PPAD, optimal (maximum value) Nash equilib-
rium is NP-hard. We proceed to show that optimal Nash equilibrium is just one of several known
NP-hard problems related to Nash equilibrium, all of which have approximate variants which
are as hard as finding a planted clique. In particular, we show this for approximate variants of
the following problems: finding a Nash equilibrium with value greater than η (for any η > 0,
even when the best Nash equilibrium has value 1 − η), finding a second Nash equilibrium, and
finding a Nash equilibrium with small support.
Finally, we consider the complexity of approximate pure Bayes Nash equilibria in two-player
games. Here we show that for general Bayesian games the problem is NP-hard. For the special
case where the distribution over types is uniform, we give a quasi-polynomial time algorithm
matched by a hardness result based on the Hidden Clique problem.
1 Introduction
The classical notion of Nash equilibrium is the most fundamental concept in the theory of non-
cooperative games. In recent years, there has been much work on the complexity of finding a Nash
equilibrium in a given game. In particular, a series of hardness results culminated in the work
of Chen et. al [CDT09], who showed that even for two-player (bimatrix) games, the problem of
computing a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete, and thus unlikely to be solvable in polynomial
time.
Therefore, it makes sense to consider the complexity of approximate equilibria. In particular, a
notion which has emerged as the focus of several works is that of an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium,
or ε-equilibrium for short, where neither player can gain more than ε (additively) by defecting to
a different strategy (without loss of generality, all payoffs are scaled to lie in the interval [0, 1]).
A straightforward sampling argument of Lipton et al. [LMM03] shows that in every game, there
exist ε-equilibria with support O(log n/ε2), and so they can be found in quasi-polynomial time
nO(logn/ε
2) by exhaustive search.
1
On the other hand, finding good polynomial time approximations has proved more challenging.
While finding a 12 -equilibrium turns out to be quite simple [DMP09], more complicated algorithms
have given a series of improvements [DMP07, BBM10, TS08], where the current best known is the
0.3393-equilibrium shown by Tsaknakis and Spirakis [TS08]. A major open question in this area is
whether or not there exists a PTAS for Nash Equilibrium (note that the algorithm of Lipton et al.
gives a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme for the problem).
Recently, Hazan and Krauthgamer [HK11] have attempted to provide evidence for the optimality
of the QPTAS of Lipton et al. [LMM03], by showing a reduction from a well-studied and seemingly
intractable problem (which can also be solved in quasi-polynomial time) to the related problem of
finding an ε-equilibrium with near maximum value (the value of an equilibrium is the average of
the payoffs of the two players).
The problem they reduce from is the Hidden Clique Problem: Given a graph sampled from
G(n, 12) with a planted (but hidden) clique of size k, find the planted clique. Since with high
probability the maximum clique in G(n, 12 ) is of size (2 − o(1)) log n, it is easy to see that for
constant δ > 0, one can distinguish between G(n, 12) and G(n,
1
2 ) with a planted clique of size
k > (2 + δ) log n in quasi-polynomial time by exhaustive search over all subsets of (2 + δ) log n
vertices. It is also not hard to extend this to an algorithm which finds the hidden clique in quasi-
polynomial time.
On the other hand, the best known polynomial time algorithm, due to Alon et al. [AKS98]
only finds cliques of size Ω(
√
n). In fact, Feige and Krauthgamer [FK03] show that even extending
this approach by using the Lova´sz-Schrijver SDP hierarchy, one still requires Ω(log n) levels of
the hierarchy (corresponding to nΩ(logn) running time to solve the SDP) just to find a hidden
clique of size n1/2−ε. The only possible approach we are aware of for breaking the Ω(
√
n) barrier
would still (assuming certain conjectures) only discover cliques of size Ω(nc) for some constant
c > 0 [FK08, BV09].
Hazan and Krauthgamer show that finding a near-optimal ε-equilibrium is as hard as finding
hidden cliques of size C log n, for some universal constant C. Here, by near-optimal we mean having
value close to maximum possible value obtained in an actual Nash equilibrium. Subsequently,
Minder and Vilenchik [MV09] then improved this hardness to planted cliques of size (2 + δ) log n
for arbitrarily small δ > 0.1 Here, we will rely on the hardness assumption for hidden cliques of
size C log n for any constant C, and will not concern ourselves with optimizing the value of C.
1.1 A Sharp Result For Near-Optimal Approximate Nash
It is important to note that the problem considered in [HK11] is not equivalent to finding an
unconstrained ε-equilibrium. In light of the results of [HK11, MV09] it is natural to ask to what
extent the hardness for near-optimal approximate equlibrium gives an indication of hardness for
unconstrained approximate equilibrium. Indeed, [HK11], in their concluding remarks, ask whether
their methods can be used to rule out a PTAS for unconstrained Nash equilibrium. One of the
messages of this paper is that these two problems are quite different in terms of approximability and
that one should not yet be overly pessimistic about the possibility for a PTAS for unconstrained
Nash equilibrium. Indeed, while there is a a polynomial time algorithm to find a 0.3393-equilibrium,
we show that finding a near-optimal (12 − η)-equilibrium is hard.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). For every η > 0, finding a near-optimal (12 −η)-approximate equilibrium
is as hard as finding a hidden clique of size C log n in G(n, 12).
1There is a small caveat: the reduction of [MV09] only certifies the presence of a hidden clique (i.e. distinguishes
the graph from the random graph G(n, 1
2
) w.h.p.) but does not identify the vertices of the clique.
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As mentioned above, there is a simple polynomial time algorithm to find a 12 -equilibrium, and
we show that this algorithm can be extended to find a 12 -equilibrium with value at least that of the
best exact equilibrium:
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). There exists a polynomial time algorithm to find a 12-approximate equi-
librium with value at least that of the optimal true equilibrium.
Thus, Theorem 1.1 is tight and unlike unconstrained Nash equilibrium, where stronger tech-
niques yield approximations better than 12 , near-optimal Nash equilibrium does not admit efficient
“non-trivial” approximations (assuming the Hidden Clique problem is hard).
1.2 The Bigger Picture: Hardness for NP-hard Variants of Nash
Just like with unconstrained ε-equilibrium, finding a near-optimal ε-equilibrium can be done in
quasi-polynomial time using the algorithm of [LMM03]. However, the exact version – finding a
maximum value Nash equilibrium – is known to be NP-hard [GZ89] and therefore harder than
its unconstrained counterpart which is in PPAD [Pap94]. In fact, maximum value Nash is one of
several optimization variants of Nash equilibrium which are NP-complete. Other variants include:
determining whether a bimatrix game has more than one Nash equilibrium [GZ89], finding a Nash
Equilibrium with minimum support [GZ89], and determining whether there exists an equilibrium
with value at least 1 − 1n or all equilibria have value at most ε/n (even for arbitrarily small ε =
ε(n) > 0) [CS03]. We show that approximate-equilibrium variants of these problems are also as
hard as Hidden Clique.
For the problem of obtaining any non-trivial approximation to the optimal value of a Nash
equilibrium, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). For every η > 0, finding an ε-equilibrium with value at least η is as hard
as finding a hidden clique of size C log n in G(n, 12), even in a game having an equilibrium of value
1− η.
For the case of determining whether a game has more than one equilibrium, note that by
continuity considerations, every two-player game has an infinite number of ε-equilibria. Thus, the
appropriate approximate analog is to consider the problem of finding two ε-equilibria with (at
least) a certain total variation distance between them. We show that this problem is also as hard
as Hidden Clique.
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). For all sufficiently small ǫ > 0, determining whether a game has two
different ε-approximate equilibria (say, having statistical distance at least 3ǫ) is as hard as finding
a hidden clique of size C log n in G(n, 12).
We then move to the problem of finding an equilibrium with small support. Recall that
by [LMM03], there exist ε-Nash equilibria with support O(log n/ε2). It is also known that for
any η > 0, in certain two-player games all (12 − η)-equilibria must have support at least log n/(1 +
log(1/η)) [FNS07] (the threshold of 12 is tight, since the simple
1
2 -equilibrium of [DMP09] has sup-
port 3). As an approximate-equilibrium variant of the Minimum Support Equilibrium problem, we
consider the problem of finding an ε-equilibrium with support at most some threshold t, and prove
the following hardness result.
Theorem 1.5 (Informal). For every η > 0, finding a (12 − η)-equilibrium with support size C ′ log n
is as hard as finding a hidden clique of size C log n in G(n, 12).
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This can be seen as a complexity-theoretic analogue of the lower bound of [FNS07] mentioned
above. Again, this contrasts with the situation for unconstrained Nash equilibrium, which is guar-
anteed to exist, and admits stronger approximations.
While these are all negative results, we again would like to stress that there is a positive message
to this story: these problems are hard because they are approximate versions of NP-complete
problems, not because they are approximate variants of Nash equilibrium. Therefore, these results
should not be viewed as indications that Nash equilibrium does not have a PTAS.
1.3 The Complexity of Approximate Pure Bayes Nash Equilibria
Finally, we consider the problem of approximating pure Bayes Nash Equilibria (BNE) in two-
player games. Bayesian games model the situation where the players’ knowledge of the world is
incomplete. In a Bayesian game, both players may be in one of a number of different states, known
as types, representing what each player knows about the state of the world, and the payoff of each
player depends on the type of both players in addition to their strategies. The types are distributed
according to some joint distribution and are not necessarily independent. A pure strategy for a
Bayesian game assigns to each type a strategy that the player plays when she is in that type. In a
pure BNE, conditioning on any given type for a given player, the player cannot gain by changing
his strategy for that type. See Section 6 for precise definitions.
Conitzer and Sandholm [CS03] have shown that determining whether a given two-player game
has a pure BNE is NP-complete. We show that this holds also for approximate pure BNE.
Theorem 1.6 (Informal). Let ε = 0.004. Then given a Bayesian game that admits a pure BNE,
it is NP-hard to find a pure ε-BNE for the game.
However, this hardness result relies heavily on the joint distribution of the players’ types being
non-uniform (in fact, not even product distribution). We show that when the distribution over
type pairs is uniform, there is in fact a quasi-polynomial time algorithm for ε-approximate pure
BNE (when a pure BNE exists).
Theorem 1.7 (Informal). For every ε > 0 there is a quasipolynomial time algorithm to find a pure
ε-BNE in two-player Bayesian games with uniformly distributed types and in which a pure BNE
exists.
We remark that this algorithm extends easily to arbitrary product distributions over types but
in order to keep the notation simple we restrict our attention to the uniform case.
The algorithm is tight: it follows immediately from our hardness for Small Support Equilibrium
that this problem is also as hard as Hidden Clique.
Theorem 1.8 (Informal). For every η > 0, finding a (14 − η)-approximate pure BNE in a two-
player Bayesian games with uniformly distributed types and in which a pure BNE exists is as hard
as finding a hidden clique of size C log n.
1.4 Organization
In Section 3 we prove the results relating to approximate equilibria with good value: Theorem 1.1
(Section 3.2), Theorem 1.2 (Section 3.4), and Theorem 1.3 (Section 3.3).
In Section 4 we prove Theorem 1.4 by a black-box application of Theorem 1.3. In Section 5 we
prove Theorem 1.5 using similar techniques as for the hardness results of Section 3. In Section 6
we prove our results for Bayesian games, Theorems 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8.
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2 Preliminaries
A bimatrix game G = (Mrow,Mcol) is a game defined by two finite matrices, Mrow andMcol, and two
players: the row player and the column player. We assume throughout that the game is normalized
so that both matrices have values in the interval [0, 1]. The row and column players choose strategies
x and y respectively, where x, y are nonnegative vectors satisfying
∑
i xi =
∑
j yj = 1. A pure
strategy is one with support 1 (i.e. a vector with 1 in one entry and 0 in the rest). The row (resp.
column) player’s payoff is given by x⊤Mrowy (resp. x⊤Mcoly).
A Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies (x, y) such that neither player has any incentive
to deviate to a different strategy, assuming the other player does not deviate. Formally, in an
equilibrium, for all i, j we have e⊤i Mrowy ≤ x⊤Mrowy and x⊤Mcolej ≤ x⊤Mcoly. An ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium, or ε-equilibrium for short, is a pair of strategies x, y where each player has
incentive at most ε to deviate. That is, for all i, j,
e⊤i Mrowy ≤ x⊤Mrowy + ε and x⊤Mcolej ≤ x⊤Mcoly + ε.
The value of a pair of strategies, denoted vG(x, y), is the average payoff of the two players, i.e.,
vG(x, y) =
1
2
(x⊤Mrowy + x⊤Mcoly) =
∑
i,j
xiyj
Mrow(i, j) +Mcol(i, j)
2
.
For a vector x ∈ Rn and S ⊆ [n], we write xS for the projection of x to the coordinates S. We
write ‖x‖ = ∑ni=1 |xi| for the ℓ1 norm of x. Thus, for a strategy (in other words, a probability
distribution) x ∈ [0, 1]n we write ‖xS‖ for the probability that the player plays an element of S.
Further, for a set S ⊆ [n] of strategies, we use vG|S(x, y) to denote the value of (x, y) conditioned
on both players playing in S. Formally,
vG|S(x, y) = E
i∼x,j∼y
[
Mrow(i, j) +Mcol(i, j)
2
∣∣∣i, j ∈ S
]
=
vG(xS , yS)
‖xS‖ · ‖yS‖ .
(If ‖xS‖ = 0 or ‖yS‖ = 0, vG|S(x, y) is undefined.)
Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), and (not necessarily disjoint) vertex sets S1, S2 ⊆ V ,
we will denote by E(S1, S2) the set of ordered pairs {(i, j) ∈ S1×S2 | {i, j} ∈ E or i = j}. We will
refer to d(S1, S2) = |E(S1, S2)|/(|S1||S2|) as the density of the pair (S1, S2).
Finally, we shall make repeated use of the following standard Chernoff bound.
Lemma 2.1 (Chernoff bound). Let X1, . . . ,Xm be i.i.d. {0, 1} random variables and let µ =
1
m E[
∑
Xi]. Then
Pr
[
1
m
∑
Xi ≥ µ+ ε
]
≤ e−2ε2m.
3 Approximate Equilibria With Good Value
3.1 The Reduction
In this section we describe the general reduction that we use to prove Theorems 1.1 and 1.3 and
describe its properties. This reduction also forms the basis for the reductions we use to prove
Theorems 1.4, 1.5 and 1.8. It is based on the reduction of [HK11].
As in [HK11] our soundness analysis proceeds by using the approximate equilibrium to find a
dense bipartite subgraph of G. The following lemma shows that this is sufficient to recover the
hidden clique.
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Lemma 3.1 ([HK11, Lemma 5.3]). There exist universal constants c1 and c2 such that the following
holds. Let G be a sample from G(n, 12) with a hidden clique of size C log n for some C ≥ c1. Then,
given a pair of vertex sets S1, S2 ⊆ [n] of size c2 log n and density d(S1, S2) ≥ 5/9 we can in
polynomial time reconstruct the hidden clique (with high probability over G).
The lemma is slightly different from Lemma 5.3 of [HK11]: there we start with a bipartite
subgraph of density 3/5 instead of 5/9 but this minor difference only changes the value of the
constant c2 – the lemma holds for any constant density strictly larger than
1
2 .
Let us now describe the reduction. It is controlled by three parameters α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1). Setting
these parameters appropriately gives the various hardness results.
Reduction 3.2. Let G = (V,E) be an n vertex graph and A its adjacency
matrix (with 1s on the diagonal). Then, for parameters α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1), we
define a (random) bimatrix game G := G(G,α, β, γ) as follows.
LetN = nc where c = (c2+1) log 1/β for the universal constant c2 of Lemma 3.1.
Pick a random N × n matrix B whose entries are i.i.d. {0, 1} variables with
expectation β. Then G = (Mrow,Mcol), where the payoff matrices are:
Mrow =
(
αA 0
B γJ
)
Mcol =
(
αA B⊤
0 γJ
)
, (1)
where J is the all-ones N ×N matrix.
We conclude this section with an additional lemma which shows how to obtain a dense bipartite
subgraph given an approximate equilibrium of G with certain properties. This lemma (and its proof)
is analogous to [HK11, Lemma 5.2], but as we need it in larger generality we also give the proof.
Lemma 3.3. Let G be as in Reduction 3.2. Fix any s ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, 1] and ε ∈ [0, 1] such that
1 − t− 3√s/2 ≥ α + ε, and let (x, y) be an ε-approximate equilibrium of G with the following two
properties:
• Both ‖x[n]‖ ≥ 1− t and ‖y[n]‖ ≥ 1− t.
• The conditional value vG|[n](x, y) ≥ (1− s)α.
Then, given (x, y) as above, we can efficiently find vertex sets S1, S2 ⊆ [n] each of size c2 log n and
density d(S1, S2) ≥ 5/9.
In the proof of Lemma 3.3 we shall use the following simple claim, which is analogous to [HK11,
Claim 5.3]:
Claim 3.4. Let S ⊂ [n] be a set of size |S| ≤ c2 log n. Then, w.h.p. over G, in any ε-equilibrium
in the above game, the probability mass a column (or row) player may place on such a set S is at
most ε+ α.
The proof of the claim follows by noting that for such S, with high probability, there is a row
i of B such that Bij = 1 for all j ∈ S. Indeed, the probability that such a row does not exist is
exactly (
1− β−|S|
)N
≤ exp(−n−c2 log 1/βN) = exp(−nlog 1/β).
We omit the remaining details as they are identical to [HK11, Claim 5.3].
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Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let x˜, y˜ ∈ [0, 1]n be the strategies x and y conditioned on playing in [n]. That
is, x˜ = x[n]/‖x[n]‖, and y˜ = y[n]/‖y[n]‖. The second given property of the strategy pair (x, y) can
be rephrased as x˜⊤Ay˜ ≥ 1− s.
Let
S′1 =
{
i ∈ [n] : e⊤i Ay˜ ≥ 1− 2
√
s/3
}
.
To obtain a lower bound on the cardinality |S′1|, we shall bound ‖xS′1‖ by ε+α and then appeal to
the claim. By the first given property of (x, y), we have
‖xS′
1
‖ ≥ 1− t− ‖x[n]\S′
1
‖ ≥ 1− t− ‖x˜[n]\S′
1
‖.
We can bound the last term, ‖x˜[n]\S′
1
‖, from above using Markov’s inequality, viz.,
‖x˜[n]\S′
1
‖ = Pr
i∼x˜
[
1− e⊤i Ay˜ > 2
√
s/3
]
≤ s
2
√
s/3
= 3
√
s/2.
Thus we have ‖xS′
1
‖ ≥ 1− t− 3√s/2 ≥ ε+ α and so by the claim, |S′1| ≥ c2 log n. Truncate S′1 by
taking any arbitrary subset S1 ⊆ S′1 of cardinality |S1| = c2 log n.
Now let x ∈ [0, 1]n be the uniform distribution over S1. Note that x⊤Ay˜ ≥ 1− 2
√
s/3. Let
S′2 =
{
j ∈ [n] : x⊤Aej ≥ 5/9
}
.
The argument to lower bound |S′2| is similar to the argument for |S′1|. We get
‖y˜[n]\S′
2
‖ = Pr
j∼y˜
[
1− x⊤Aej > 4/9
]
≤ 2
√
s/3
4/9
= 3
√
s/2.
and therefore
‖xS′
2
‖ ≥ 1− t− 3√s/2 ≥ ε+ α,
as desired. Again, we can truncate S′2 by taking a subset S2 ⊆ S′2 of cardinality |S′2| = c2 log n. By
construction d(S1, S2) ≥ 5/9, and we are done.
3.2 Hardness for ε close to 1
2
To obtain Theorem 1.1 the main requirement is to set α = 12 + O(η). The values of β and γ are
essentially irrelevant in this case – the only thing needed is that β is bounded away from both 0
and α and that γ ≤ 12 .
Lemma 3.5. Let α = 12 + t, γ ≤ 12 and G be the game of Reduction 3.2. Then for any pair of
strategies (x, y) with value at least vG(x, y) ≥ α− t2 it holds that ‖x[n]‖ and ‖y[n]‖ are both at least
1− t.
Proof. Let p = ‖x[n]‖ and q = ‖y[n]‖. As the value of any outcome outside the αA block is at most
1
2 , we have that the value of (x, y) is at most
pqα+ (1− pq)1
2
= tpq +
1
2
,
so that if the value is at least α− t2 we have
tpq +
1
2
≥ α− t2
pq ≥ α− t
2 − 1/2
t
= 1− t
Since p, q ∈ [0, 1], it follows that they are both at least 1− t.
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Observation 3.6. Let (x, y) be any pair of strategies with value vG(x, y) ≥ 12 and ‖x[n]‖ > 0,
‖y[n]‖ > 0. Then vG|[n](x, y) ≥ vG(x, y), provided that γ ≤ 12 .
Plugging this into Lemma 3.3, we can now easily complete the proof of hardness for ε close to
1
2 .
Theorem 3.7 (Detailed Statement of Theorem 1.1). For every η > 0 there exist δ = Ω(η2),
α ≥ 12 and universal constant C not depending on η such that the following holds. Given a graph
G = (V,E) we can in randomized polynomial time construct a bimatrix game G with maximum
value α (over all strategy pairs) such that, if G = G(n, 12) with a hidden clique of size C log n, the
following holds (w.h.p. over G and G):
Completeness There is a Nash equilibrium (x, y) with value α.
Soundness Given any (12 −η)-equilibrium with value ≥ α−δ, we can efficiently recover the hidden
clique.
Proof. Given a graph G = (V,E), we apply Reduction 3.2 with parameters as follows. For some
t > 0 to be determined momentarily, let α = 12 + t, β = γ = 1/3, δ = t
2.
For the completeness, we shall show that having both players play uniformly over the hidden
clique is an equilibrium. For this to hold, we have to make sure that there is no row in B with
average value at least α in the positions corresponding to the clique. By Lemma 2.1 and a union
bound over all rows of B we can bound the probability of this happening by
Ne−2(α−β)
2C logn ≤ N · n−C/18.
If C is a sufficiently large universal constant (e.g., C = 18 · (c2 + 1) log 1/β + 1) this probability is
o(1) and the completeness property follows.
For the soundness, consider any (12 − η)-approximate equilibrium (x, y) with value at least
vG(x, y) ≥ α − δ = α − t2. By Lemma 3.5 both ‖x[n]‖ and ‖y[n]‖ are at least 1 − t. Furthermore,
by Observation 3.6 we have vG|[n](x, y) ≥ α− δ ≥ α(1− t2).
Now if 12−η ≤ 1− t−3t/2−α = 12−7t/4 we can apply Lemma 3.3 and extract a dense bipartite
subgraph of G which can be plugged in to Lemma 3.1 to obtain the hidden clique. Setting t = 4η/7
we get the result.
3.3 Distinguishing Between Low and High Value
For Theorem 1.3 the choices of all three parameters α, β, γ of Reduction 3.2 are important. We are
going to set γ close to 0, and α > β both close to 1.
On a high level, the proof has the same structure as that of Theorem 1.1. However, in the
current setting Lemma 3.5 and Observation 3.6 do not apply. To arrive at similar conclusions we
use a different argument, exploiting the fact that (x, y) is a ε-equilibrium. Essentially, the argument
is as follows: the off-diagonal blocks (B and B⊤) are not stable, since there is too much incentive
for at least one player to deviate. Therefore, most of the probability mass in an equilibrium is
concentrated either in the αA block, or in the γJ block. However, in the γJ block, the value is
too small. So, if the equilibrium has even slightly larger value, its mass must be concentrated in
the αA block. There it has to actually have very large value, since otherwise, there is incentive for
both players to deviate to B and B⊤ to get reward β. The rest of the proof follows as before.
Formally, we have the following lemma, showing that (under certain conditions) any ε-equilibrium
with non-negligible value must satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3.3.
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Lemma 3.8. Fix a parameter ε ∈ (0, 1), let α− β ≤ ε, and γ = 4√ε and consider the game G as
in Reduction 3.2.
Then, w.h.p. over G, any ε-equilibrium (x, y) with value more than 5√ε satisfies:
• Both ‖x[n]‖ and ‖y[n]‖ are at least 1−
√
ε.
• vG|[n](x, y) ≥ α− 3ε.
Proof. Consider any ε-equilibrium (x, y) with value more than 5
√
ε. Note that this trivially implies
that ε ≤ 1/25.
Let p = ‖x[n]‖ and q = ‖y[n]‖ be the probability mass that the row (resp. column) player assigns
to the first n strategies in this equilibrium. We begin with the first item, i.e., the lower bound on
p and q.
Consider the row player’s incentive to deviate by shifting the probability mass in the first n
rows to the uniform distribution over the remaining rows. When the column player is playing
outside the first n columns, this deviation changes the row player’s payoff from 0 to γ, and when
the column player is playing in one of the first n columns the row player’s payoff decreases by at
most α− β + o(1). Let us ignore this o(1) term. Since this is an ε-equilibrium, we have
p(1− q)γ − pq(α− β) ≤ ε, (2)
and so
p(1− q) ≤ 1
γ
(ε+ pq(α− β))
≤ 1
γ
(ε+ α− β)
≤ √ε/2
Considering also the symmetric argument for the column player, this gives
max{p(1− p), q(1 − q)} ≤ max{p(1− q), q(1− p)} ≤ √ε/2, (3)
where the first inequality holds trivially for all p, q ∈ [0, 1]. The inequality p(1−p) ≤ √ε/2 together
with the constraint ε ≤ 1/25 implies that either p ≤ √ε or p ≥ 1−√ε. The inequality for q gives
an analogous bound. Moreover, it cannot be the case that p < 12 < q or q <
1
2 < p, since then we
would have max{p(1 − q), q(1 − p)} ≥ 14 , contradicting (3). Thus, it follows that either p, q ≤
√
ε
or p, q ≥ 1−√ε.
Let us now exclude the first option. Suppose for contradiction that p, q ≤ √ε. Then the value
of the equilibrium is at most
pqα+ (p(1− q) + q(1− p)) · 1
2
+ (1− p)(1− q)γ ≤ εα+√ε/2 + γ ≤ εα+ 4.5√ε < 5√ε,
contradicting the assumption that (x, y) has value more than 5
√
ε. Hence both p and q are at least
1−√ε.
It remains to give a lower bound on the conditional value w := vG|[n](x, y) obtained when playing
inside αA. As above, consider the incentive for the row player to deviate to the uniform distribution
over. To be more precise, we can use w instead of α in the bound (2). Solving for w gives
w ≥ β + p(1− q)γ − ε
pq
≥ β − ε
pq
≥ β − 2ε ≥ α− 3ε,
where we used that 1pq ≤ 1(1−√ε)2 ≤ 2516 < 2 for ε ≤ 1/25.
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Equipped with Lemma 3.8, it is easy to finish the proof of Theorem 1.3.
Theorem 3.9 (Detailed statement of Theorem 1.3). For every constant η > 0 there exist ε = Ω(η2)
and C = O(1/η3) such that the following holds. Given a graph G, we can in randomized polynomial
time construct a bimatrix game G such that, if G = G(n, 12) with a hidden clique of size C log n,
the following holds (w.h.p. over G and G):
Completeness There is a Nash equilibrium (x, y) with both players earning payoff 1− η.
Soundness Given any ε-equilibrium with value ≥ η, we can efficiently recover the hidden clique.
Proof. Given a graph G = (V,E), we apply Reduction 3.2 with parameters as follows.
Let ε = (η/5)2, α = 1−η = 1−5√ε, β = α−ε, and γ = 4√ε. Assume without loss of generality
that η is small enough so that α > 3/4.
For the completeness, we proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.7. We can upper bound the
probability that the uniform distribution over the hidden clique is not an equilibrium by
Ne−2(α−β)
2C logn ≤ Nn−Ω(Cε2).
We have N = nO(log 1/β) = nO(η) = nO(
√
ε). Letting C be a sufficiently large multiple of 1/ε1.5 the
completeness property follows.
For the soundness analysis, take any ε-approximate equilibrium (x, y) with value at least 5
√
ε.
By Lemma 3.8, w.h.p. (x, y) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.3 with t =
√
ε and s = 3εα ≤ 4ε.
The only remaining thing to check is the condition α+ ε ≤ 1− t− 3√s/2, which is easily verified
(1− 4√ε is an upper bound for the LHS and a lower bound for the RHS).
3.4 An Algorithm For Good 1
2
-Approximate Equilibria
In this section we prove Theorem 1.2 by describing a simple algorithm to find a 12 -approximate
Nash equilibrium with at least as good value as the best exact Nash equilibrium. This shows that
the bound on ε in Theorem 1.1 is tight.
For general 12 -approximate equilibria (without any constraint on the value), the following simple
algorithm was suggested by Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitiou [DMP09]. Start by choosing an
arbitrary pure strategy ei for the row player, let ej be the column player’s best response to ei, and
let ek be the row player’s best response to ej . Then the following is a
1
2 -equilibrium: let the column
player play ej , and let the row player play ei with probability
1
2 and ek with probability
1
2 (neither
player can gain more than 12 by deviating, since each player is playing a best response strategy with
probability 12). Thus, every bimatrix game has a
1
2 -approximate equilibrium in which one of the
players plays a pure strategy. We show that this is also the case for optimal value 12 -equilibria.
Lemma 3.10. For every bimatrix game which has a Nash equilibrium of value v, there exists a
1
2-approximate equilibrium with value at least v in which one of the players plays a pure strategy.
Proof. Let Mrow and Mcol be the payoff matrices for the row and column players, respectively. Let
(x∗, y∗) be a Nash equilibrium in this game of value v := vG(x∗, y∗), and let vr and vc be the payoff
in this equilibrium to the row and column players, respectively (hence v = 12 (vr + vc)). Without
loss of generality, assume vr ≥ vc (otherwise, a symmetric argument applies).
Let the pure strategy ej be some strategy in the support of y
∗ for which the row player’s payoff
is at least vr (when the row player is playing x
∗ and the column player ej). Such a strategy exists
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since vr is the expected payoff for the row player when the column player plays according to y
∗.
Furthermore, any such ej is a best response to x
∗ since (x∗, y∗) is an equilibrium.
Clearly, if the pair of strategies (x∗, ej) is a 12 -equilibrium we are done, since both the row and
colum player are getting at least the same payoff as for the pair (x∗, y∗).
If (x∗, ej) is not a 12 -equilibrium, this must be because the row player has incentive ≥ 12 to
deviate (as the column player is by definition playing a best response). Note that this implies that
vc ≤ vr ≤ 12 since the row player’s incentive to deviate can never be more than 1 − vr. Let ek
be some best response for the row player, and consider the pair of strategies
(
1
2(x
∗ + ek), ej
)
. As
above, this is a 12 -equilibrium, since both players are playing a best response with probability
1
2 .
Furthermore, the payoff for the row player is at least vr/2+(vr+1/2)/2 ≥ vr+1/4 ≥ vr+vc/2, and
the payoff for the column player is at least vc/2. Thus the value is at least
1
2(vr + vc/2+ vc/2) = v,
and we are done.
Now our algorithm follows immediately.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Let Mrow and Mcol be the payoff matrices for the row and column matrices,
respectively. By Lemma 3.10 there exists such an equilibrium in which one player plays a pure
strategy. Suppose this is the column player (otherwise, a symmetric algorithm applies). Try all
possible pure strategies ej for the column player. For each such strategy, solve the following linear
program (if it is feasible):
maximize 12x
⊤(Mc +Mrow)ej
subject to x⊤Mcolej′ ≤ x⊤Mcolej + 12 ∀j′
(ei)
⊤Mrowej ≤ x⊤Mrowej + 12 ∀i
xi ≥ 0 ∀i∑
i
xi = 1
For at least one strategy ej , this LP is feasible and computes a
1
2 -equilibrium with at least the
desired value.
4 Finding A Second Equilibrium
In the following Theorem, dTV refers to the total variation distance between two vectors, i.e.,
dTV(x, y) =
1
2
∑ |xi − yi|.
Theorem 4.1 (Detailed Statement of Theorem 1.4). There is a C > 0 such that the following holds
for all sufficiently small ε > 0. Given a graph G we can in randomized polynomial time construct
a bimatrix game G′ which admits a pure Nash equilibrium (ei, ej) such that, if G = G(n, 12) with a
hidden clique of size C log n, the following holds (w.h.p. over G and G′):
Completeness There is a Nash equilibrium (x, y) such that dTV(ei, x) = dTV(ej , y) = 1.
Soundness Given any ε-approximate equilibrium (x, y) of G′ with dTV(ei, x) ≥ ε + O(ε2) or
dTV(ej , y) ≥ ε+O(ε2), we can efficiently recover the hidden clique.
Remark 4.2. Note that the bound ε+O(ε2) on the statistical distance is almost tight: given any true
equilibrium (x, y) there are ε-approximate equilibria (x′, y′) with dTV(x, x′) ≥ ε and dTV(y, y′) ≥ ε.
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Proof. Given G, first construct the game G of Theorem 3.9 with parameter η = 1/10, so that given
a (4ε)-approximate equilibrium of G with value at least 1/10 we can reconstruct the hidden clique.
Let (Mrow,Mcol) be the payoff matrices of G and let N denote their dimension. Consider the new
(N + 1)-strategy game G′ = (M ′row,M ′col), with the following payoff matrices.
M ′row =
(
Mrow 0
λ 1
)
M ′col =
(
Mcol λ
⊤
0 1
)
, (4)
where λ is the 1 × N vector with each coordinate equal to λ. We set λ = 8/10. G′ is a bimatrix
game of size (N + 1)× (N + 1).
Clearly, (eN+1, eN+1) is a pure Nash equilibrium of G′. Note that for any mixed strategy x, we
can write dTV(eN+1, x) = 1− xN+1 so it suffices to obtain good bounds on xN+1 and yN+1.
Furthermore the completeness case also follows immediately since in that case G has a Nash
equilibrium with both players earning payoff 9/10. As λ ≤ 8/10 this is an equilibrium in G′ as well
and since it does not use the (N + 1)’st strategy we obtain the completeness property.
For the soundness, consider any ε-approximate equilibrium (x, y) of G′, let p = ‖x[N ]‖, q =
‖y[N ]‖ be the probability that the row (resp. column) player plays in the original game G where
xN+1 < 1−ε−O(ε2) and yN+1 < 1−ε−O(ε2). We need to show that (x, y) can be used to recover
the planted clique.
Let (x˜, y˜) = (x[N ]/p, y[N ]/q) denote the strategies conditioned on playing on the first N strate-
gies. We claim that (x˜, y˜) must be an ε′-approximate equilibrium for the original game G, with
ε′ = εpq . To see this, suppose for contradiction that one of the players, say the row player, gains ε
′
in G by deviating to some strategy ei′ . Consider “lifting” this to a new strategy x′ for G′ (i.e., in
the strategy x′ the row player plays eN+1 with probability 1− p, and ei′ with probability p). The
change in payoff the row player obtains in G′ by switching from x to x′ can be written as
p(qε′ + (1− q) · 0), (5)
where the qε′ term is what the row player gains from when the column player plays on the first N
strategies, and the other term is 0 since, when the column player plays on N + 1 the row player
gets the same payoff on all the first N strategies. As (x, y) is an ε-approximate equilibrium in G′,
(5) must be bounded by ε and hence
ε′ ≤ ε
pq
. (6)
Now the same argument as in the first part of the proof of Lemma 3.8 gives that
ε ≥ pq(λ− 1) + p(1− q)(1 − 0) (row player’s incentive to deviate)
= p(1− 11q/10) (by choice of λ)
≥ p(1− 11p/10).
This quadratic inequality in p implies that either p ≤ ε + O(ε2) or 11p/10 ≥ 1 − ε − O(ε2). The
first possibility is ruled out by our assumption, therefore p > 1011 (1 − ε − O(ε2)), and similarly
q > 1011 (1− ε−O(ε2)).
It is easy to see that the value of (x˜, y˜) must be at least 1/10 because (x, y) is an ε-equilibrium
for G′. By the choice of parameters, if (x˜, y˜) is also a (4ε)-approximate equilibrium for G then we
can reconstruct the hidden clique and we are done. But this follows easily from (6).
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5 Small support equilibria
In this section, we show hardness of finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with small (logarith-
mic) support when one exists, even for ε close to 12 . Note that an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium
for two-player n′-strategy games with support at most O(log n′/ε) is guaranteed to exist by the
algorithm of Lipton et al. [LMM03]. Here we consider approximate equilibria with smaller (but still
logarithmic) support. Also, note that this is tight, since for ε = 12 , we have the simple algorithm
of [DMP09], which gives a 12 equilibrium of support 3.
Our reduction for small support equilibria involves the following construction, which is very
similar to the earlier one.
Reduction 5.1. Given a graph G = (V,E) with adjacency matrix A, construct
a game G = (Mrow,Mcol) as follows.
Mrow =


αA 0 . . . 0
B
... R
B

 Mcol =


αA B⊤ . . . B⊤
0
... J −R
0

 , (7)
where B is an N1 × n matrix whose entries are i.i.d. {0, 1} variables with ex-
pectation β. As in Reduction 3.2, N1 = n
c where c = (c2 + 1) log 1/β and c2 is
the constant from Lemma 3.1.
Each payoff matrix of (7) contains N2 identical copies of B, and R is an N1N2×
N1N2 uniformly random {0, 1} matrix.
Theorem 5.2. For every η > 0 there exists C > 0 such that finding a (12 − η)-equilibrium with
support at most (log n)/2 is as hard as finding a hidden clique of size C log n in G(n, 12).
Proof. Given a graph G from G(n, 12) (possibly with a hidden clique), construct the game G as
in Reduction 5.1 with the following parameters: let α = 12 + η/8, let β = α + (
1
2 − η) − η2/8 =
1− 78η−η2/8. We choose the dimension N2 as N2 = nc
′
, where c′ is chosen to satisfy (η2/8)2c′ = 4c.
Since c = (c2+1) log 1/β = Θ(η) we have that c
′ = Θ(1/η3). We choose the density C of the hidden
clique to be C = c′/2 + 1.
Note that the number of strategies is n + N1N2 = n + n
c′+c, so that we are looking for an
equilibrium with support at most 12 log(n + n
c′+c) = C ′ log n for some c′/2 ≤ C ′ ≤ c′/2 + 1
(assuming η is sufficiently small).
The completeness follows easily. Suppose G contains a hidden clique of size C log n > C ′ log n.
Then if both players play uniformly over the same subset of C ′ log n clique vertices, they both
achieve reward α. The probability that, say, the row player can gain 12−η (i.e. get payoff α+ 12−η =
β + η2/8) by deviating to some row in B (note that he can only deviate to rows in copies of B) is
by the Chernoff bound Lemma 2.1 and a union bound at most
N1e
−(η2/8)2C′ logn = nc−(η
2/8)2C′ ≤ nc−(η2/8)2c′/2 = n−c.
Now, for the soundness, consider any (12 − η)-equilibrium (x, y). Let us first show that both
players must have most of their probability concentrated in the αA block. Let p = ‖x[n]‖ and
q = ‖y[n]‖ (the probabilities that each player plays in the first n rows/columns). Let us consider
the two player’s incentive to deviate. In the αA block, the row player achieves at most payoff α,
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and can achieve payoff β − o(1) by playing uniformly over all rows in B (w.h.p. this is true for
all distributions over columns in [n]). In particular, there exists at least one row in B in which
the row player can achieve this value. Now consider the right hand side of the payoff matrix. Let
λ ∈ [0, 1] be the payoff that the row player receives in R (thus, the column player receives 1 − λ
here). For any row in B, there are N2 corresponding rows in R (one corresponding to each copy
of B). Since the column player’s support is at most C ′ log n, the probability that regardless of the
column player’s choice of support, there will be at least one row among these that has all 1’s in the
corresponding positions is at least
1− nC′ logn(1− 2−C′ logn)N2 ≥ 1− nC′ logn exp(−2−C′ lognN2)
= 1− nC′ logne−n−C
′
+c′
≥ 1− nC′ logne−nc
′/2−1
.
Thus, w.h.p. for every row in B and every possible strategy for the column player (up to the
restriction on support size), there is a row in R corresponding to the correct row in B s.t. the row
player would achieve payoff 1 in R (by deviating to this row). In particular, this is true for the
row in B where the row player can achieve value β − o(1) (as before, we will ignore this o(1)). To
summarize, by deviating, the row player can gain at least
qp(β − α) + (1− q)(1− (1− p)λ).
Similarly, the column player’s incentive to deviate is at least
pq(β − α) + (1− p)(1− (1− q)(1− λ)).
On average, the two players’ incentive to deviate is at least
pq(β − α) + 12((1 − p) + (1− q))− 12(1− p)(1− q) = pq(β − α) + 12(1− pq),
and since this incentive is at most 12 − η, we have
pq(β − α− 12) + 12 ≤ 12 − η, (8)
or
pq ≥ η/(12 − (β − α)) = η/(η + η2/8) > 1− η/8.
Now it remains to bound the conditional value w that is achieved in the αA block. This we can
do using the same analysis as above, but substituting w for α. Making this substitution in (8) and
solving for w we have
w ≥ η/pq + β − 12 = η/pq + 12 − 7η/8 − η2/8
≥ 12 + η/8 − η2/8
= α(1− η2/(4 + η)) ≥ α(1− η2/4).
We are now in a position to apply Lemma 3.3. As stated Lemma 3.3 only applies to Reduc-
tion 3.2 and not the present reduction but it can be verified that it works also in this case (what is
needed is that the size of B is the same, and the presence of an approximate equilibrium with most
mass in A and good value in A). We have t = η/8 and s = η2/4 which is easily checked to satisfy
the condition 1 − t − 3√s/2 ≥ α + (12 − η). Thus we conclude the existence of a dense bipartite
subgraph which, as before, allows us to reconstruct the hidden clique.
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Note that we have a much smaller gap between the completeness and hardness above than
in the other problems we have considered. In particular, we do not claim that finding a 12 − η-
equilibrium with small support is hard even when an exact equilibrium with small support exists.
However, modifying parameters in the above proof, such hardness can be shown for a smaller
additive approximation:
Theorem 5.3. For every η > 0 there exists C > 0 such that finding a (14 − η)-equilibrium with
support at most O(log n) in a two-player game which admits a pure Nash equilibrium is as hard as
finding a hidden clique of size C log n in G(n, 12).
6 Computing approximate pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium
Bayesian games model the situation where the players’ knowledge of the world is incomplete. In
this paper we focus on Bayesian games with two players, but the results generalize to an arbitrary
number of players. More details on Bayesian games can be found in most Game Theory textbooks,
for example in [FT91].
In a Bayesian game the payoff of the players depends on the state of the world in addition
to the players’ strategies. In a situation with two players, the row player and the column player,
each player is presented with a signal, called type, about the state of the world θrow ∈ Θrow and
θcol ∈ Θcol, respectively. The types are distributed according to some joint distribution P and
are not necessarily independent. The types determine the payoff matrices Mrow(θrow, θcol) and
Mcol(θrow, θcol). Denote the set of rows and columns in this matrix by Srow and Scol, respectively.
Each player chooses an action srow ∈ Srow and scol ∈ Scol from their respective set of actions. The
payoff function of the first player is thus urow(srow, scol, θrow, θcol) =Mrow(θrow, θcol)srow,scol ∈ [0, 1].
The payoff function ucol is defined similarly. The payoff matrices, that depend on the players’ types,
as well as the distribution on types is known to the players ahead of the game.
A pure strategy for the row player in a Bayesian game is a function (that by a slight abuse
of notation) we denote by srow : Θrow → Srow that for each type θrow as observed by row player
associates a strategy srow(θrow) that the player chooses to execute. A pure strategy scol : Θcol →
Srow is defined similarly.
Denote by Pθrow the distribution on player column player’s types θcol conditioned on the type
θrow being observed. For a pair of pure strategies (srow, scol) the payoff function of the row player
is given by
prow(θrow) = E
θcol∼Pθrow
[urow(srow(θrow), scol(θcol), θrow, θcol)].
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian game, is a pair of functions srow, scol such that
for all types observed, neither player has an incentive to deviate from his current strategy. In other
words, for each θrow, and for each s
′
row ∈ Srow,
prow(θrow) ≥ E
θcol∼Pθrow
[urow(s
′
row, scol(θcol), θrow, θcol)],
and a similar condition holds for pcol.
Since a pure Nash equilibrium need not exist in non-Bayesian games, it need not exist in
Bayesian games either. Moreover, while verifying whether a non-Bayesian two player game has
a pure Nash equilibrium is trivial, verifying whether a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists is
NP-hard [CS03]. Furthermore, as the example in [CS03] demonstrates, this problem remains hard
even when the distribution on types is uniform and the payoff does not depend on the players’
types.
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A pure ε-Bayesian Nash equilibrium (ε-BNE) is defined similarly to an ε-Nash equilibrium. For
each observed type θrow, the incentive to deviate should be bounded by ε:
prow(θrow) > E
θcol∼Pθrow
[urow(s
′
row, scol(θcol), θrow, θcol)]− ε.
A similar requirement should hold for the column player.
We show that for general distributions on types and for some small constant ε, finding a pure
ε-BNE in games where a pure BNE exists is still NP-hard. On the other hand, we also show that
if the distribution on the players’ types is uniform, whenever a pure BNE exists, a pure ε-BNE can
be found in quasi-polynomial time.
6.1 General distributions on types
We show that for some constant ε, determining whether a pure strategy ε-Bayes Nash equilibrium
exists is NP-hard. Specifically, ε = 0.004 suffices. We prove:
Theorem 6.1. Let ε = 0.004. Then given a Bayesian game that admits a pure BNE, it is NP-
hard to find a pure ε-BNE for the game. Moreover, it is NP-hard to solve the promise problem of
distinguishing games that admit a pure BNE from games that do not admit a pure ε-BNE.
Proof. We give a reduction from the problem of 3-coloring 4-regular graphs, which is known to be
NP-complete [Dai80]. Let G = (V,E) be a 4-regular graph with |V | = n. The edges of G can be
properly colored with 5 colors using Vizing’s algorithm. In other words, we can compute a coloring
c : E → {1, . . . , 5} such that for every two edges e1, e2 incident to the same vertex, c(e1) 6= c(e2).
We now design a Bayesian game such that:
• if G is 3-colorable, then the game admits a pure BNE;
• if G is not 3-colorable, then the game admits no pure ε-BNE.
The type of each of the players corresponds to a vertex in the graph, thus Θrow = Θcol = V .
The distribution on types is such that with probability 4/5, (θ1, θ2) is a random edge in E; with
probability 1/5, (θ1, θ2) = (θ, θ) is the same random vertex in V . We note that in this example
there is a high degree of correlation between the types of the two players.
Each player has 6 strategies available to him: Srow = Scol = {1, 2, 3} × {0, 1}. The first
coordinate of srow(v) should be thought of as the “color” assigned by player A to vertex v, while
the second coordinate is either “head” or “tails”, the use of which will be explained later. We
denote the first coordinate by srow(v)1 ∈ {1, 2, 3} and the second by srow(v)2 ∈ {0, 1}.
The payoff functions are defined as follows (srow and scol stand for srow(θrow) and scol(θcol),
respectively):
θrow
?
= θcol (srow)1
?
= (scol)1 (srow)2
?
= (scol)2 urow ucol
yes yes 1 1
yes no yes 0.64 0
yes no no 0 0.64
no no 1 1
no yes yes 0.01 × 2c(θrow,θcol) 0
no yes no 0 0.01 × 2c(θrow,θcol)
In other words, the first coordinate of the strategy represents vertex color. The players are
rewarded for producing a consistent 3-coloring: for the same vertex θ the colors (srow(θ))1 and
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(scol(θ))1 should match; for different vertexes connected by an edge the colors (srow(θrow))1 and
(scol(θcol))1 should differ. If these conditions are satisfied, both players are rewarded with a payoff
of 1. If a certain edge or vertex fails to satisfy the conditions, the games becomes a zero-sum games
that depends on the second coordinate of the players’ strategies. The payoff can take values of 0.02,
0.04, 0.08, 0.16, 0.32 for edge pairs (θrow, θcol) and the value of 0.64 for vertex pairs (θ, θ). What
makes these values interesting is that no combination of these values with coefficients of −1, 0,+1
adds up to less than 0.02.
If the graph G admits a 3-coloring C : V → {1, 2, 3}, then the pure strategy srow(v) = scol(v) =
(C(v), 0) yields the optimal possible payoff of 1 for both players, and thus is a pure BNE.
On the other hand, suppose that G is not 3-colorable. Let srow(v), scol(v) be a set of pure
strategies that is an ε-BNE. Denote the expected payoff functions under these strategies by urow(v)
and ucol(v). If the row player deviates in her strategy from (srow(v)1, srow(v)2) to (srow(v)1, 1 −
srow(v)2) her payoff only changes for type pairs where the conditions are not satisfied. Let us denote
this change by ∆row(v). The contribution of each edge (vrow, vcol) to ∆row(vrow) and ∆col(vcol)
cancels out, and hence, summing over all edges,
∑
v∈V
(∆row(v) + ∆col(v)) = 0. (9)
By the way we designed our payoffs, the values of ∆row(v) and ∆col(v) are integer multiples of
0.004. Moreover, if at least one edge adjacent to v is not satisfied, then ∆row(v) cannot be equal
to 0. Since G is not 3-colorable, it means that ∆row(v) 6= 0 for at least one of the vertexes. By (9)
this means that ∆row(v) > 0 or ∆col(v) > 0 and thus ∆row(v) ≥ 0.004 or ∆col(v) ≥ 0.004. This
contradicts the assumption that (srow, scol) is an ε-BNE.
6.2 Uniform distribution on types
In this section we show that in the case where the distribution on types is uniform, a pure ε-BNE can
be computed in quasi-polynomial time. This contrasts with the previously noted fact from [CS03]
that computing a pure BNE is NP-hard even in this special case. As for other quasi-polynimial
time computable approximate equilibria we’ve considered, whose exact variants are NP-hard, this
problem is also as hard as Hidden Clique:
Theorem 6.2. For every η > 0, finding a (14 −η)-approximate pure BNE in a two-player Bayesian
games with uniformly distributed types and in which a pure BNE exists is as hard as finding a
hidden clique of size C log n.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 5.3. Let Mrow andMcol be as in Reduction 5.1 with
parameters set in order to achieve the 14 − η-hardness of Theorem 5.3. Consider the Bayesian game
in which both players have exactly C ′ log n types,
the distribution over types is uniform, and the payoff matrices for each player are always the
same Mrow and Mcol as above. Note that when there is a hidden clique, the following is an pure
BNE: choose a subset S of C ′ log n clique vertices, and let each player play according to a one-to-one
mapping from their type set to S. On the other hand, it is easy to see that every pair of pure
strategies for the Bayesian game corresponds to mixed strategies for the original game, where the
incentive to deviate for, say, the row player, is the expected incentive to deviate in the Bayesian
game (over all choices of types for the row player). In particular, if a player always has incentive
at most 14 − η to deviate in the Bayesian game, their incentive will be at most 14 − η in the original
game, and so by Theorem 5.3, we can recover the hidden clique.
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We also note that our result generalizes to the case when the distribution on types is a product
distribution, i.e. when θrow is independent from θcol. To simplify the presentation we further assume
that the type space is of equal size for both players, i.e. |Θrow| = |Θcol| = k. We prove:
Theorem 6.3. In a two-player Bayesian game, suppose that the types are distributed uniformly on
the space Θrow ×Θcol, and that |Θrow| = |Θcol| = k, and |Srow| = |Scol| = n. Assuming that a pure
BNE exists, we can find a pure ε-BNE in time nO((logn+log k)/ε
2).
Remark 6.4. The assumption in Theorem 6.3 can be relaxed to a pure (ε/2)-BNE equilibrium
existing (instead of an actual equilibrium).
Proof. The proof is similar in spirit to the quasi-polynomial ε-Nash algorithm of [LMM03], but some
additional work is needed. We first (approximately) guess the payoffs and the allowed strategies for
both players for all possible types. We then use linear programming to produce a (not necessarily
pure) (3ε/4)-BNE. We then sample from this approximate non-pure BNE to obtain a pure ε-BNE.
For simplicity, denote Θrow = Θcol = {1, . . . , k} and Srow = Scol = {1, . . . , n}. Let srow : Θrow →
Srow, scol : Θcol → Scol be a pair of pure equilibrium strategies (that we assume exist). Let prowij
and pcolij be the corresponding payoff values. In other words, p
row
ij is the payoff the row player gets
when his type is i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and he plays strategy j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The equilibrium assumption
is that for all i,
prowi,srow(i) = maxj
prowij ,
and a similar condition holds for pcol. We first claim that we can recover all the values of prow and
pcol within an error of ε/4 with probability > n−O((log(nk))/ε
2).
Claim 6.5. There is a polynomial time algorithm that with probability > n−O((log(nk))/ε2) outputs
values qrowij , q
col
ij such that for all i, j, |qrowij − prowij | < ε/8 and |qcolij − pcolij | < ε/8.
Proof. We show how to approximate prow well with probability > n−O((log(nk))/ε2). The claim
follows by approximating prow and pcol independently. Pick a subset of m = ⌈(40 log(nk))/ε2⌉
of the column player’s types t1, . . . , tm ∈ {1, . . . , k}. For each type tr guess the column player’s
strategy sr on this type. With probability n
−m we correctly guess all strategies, i.e. sr = scol(tr)
for all r. Set
qrowij =
1
m
m∑
r=1
urow(j, sr, i, tr).
In other words, we calculate an estimate of the expected payoff prow using only the value at the
types we’ve guessed. By Hoeffding’s Inequality, for each (i, j) the probability
P[|qrowij − prowij | ≥ ε/8] ≤ 2 · exp(−mε2/32) < 1/(4nk).
The claim follows by union bound.
Allowing for a blow-up of nO((log(nk))/ε
2) in running time, we may assume from now on that the
correct values of qrow and qcol had been computed (up to an error of ε/8), since in the end we can
check whether the set of pure strategies obtained is a ε-BNE.
Next, we formulate a linear program that obtains a (3ε/4)-BNE with payoff values close to
qrow, qcol. The variables of the program are Xrowij and X
col
ij , where X
row
ij corresponds to the proba-
bility that the row player plays strategy j on type i. For each type i let
M rowi := max
j
qrowij
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be the maximum possible payoff the row player can attain on type i under payoffs qrowij . We only
allow Xrowij to be non-zero when the corresponding payoff q
row
ij > M
row
i − ε/8. This guarantees that
the solution we obtain is a (3ε/4)-BNE. In addition, we enforce the payoffs to be close to qrowij . For
each i, j we have the constraint
∣∣∣∣∣qrowij −
1
k
·
∑
y,z
Xcolyz · urow(j, z, i, y)
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε/4,
and a similar condition on the Xrow’s. This linear program is feasible since the pure BNE we
assumed exists is a solution to it. Denote the resulting expected payoffs by vrowij and v
col
ij .
The solution thus obtained is a (3ε/4)-BNE. To see this, we actually observe that the equilibrium
is well supported: for each type i, each strategy j with Xrowij 6= 0 the payoff vrowij ≥M rowi − 3ε/8 ≥
maxj′ v
row
ij′ − 5ε/8.
To complete the proof we now obtain a set of pure strategies s′row : Θrow → Srow, s′col :
Θcol → Scol by sampling j = s′row(i) according to the probability distribution Xrowij . Assuming
k = Ω((log(nk))/ε2), once again by Hoeffding’s Inequality the payoffs will be ε/8-close to the
payoffs vrowij , and thus the resulting game will be in an ε-BNE.
In the case when k = O((log(nk))/ε2), i.e. the number of types is small, we can find the exact
BNE by brute force, completing the proof of the theorem.
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